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Putting Separation of Powers into Practice: 
Reºections on Senator Schumer’s Essay 
 
Patricia Wald∗ 
Neil Kinkopf∗∗ 
I. Introduction 
Senator Schumer identiªes a “sustained and systematic assault” from 
Congress’s sister branches as the primary cause of weakening Congressional 
power in recent years.1 He provides a masterful account of the presiden-
tial strategy of bypassing consultation with Congress, resisting oversight 
of executive operations, and reinterpreting the laws Congress passes. 
Somewhat less convincingly, he ªnds a threat “no less nefarious” in re-
cent Supreme Court doctrines that, in his view, usurp Congressional fact-
ªnding powers in order to declare laws unconstitutional. It is, according 
to Senator Schumer, the “unprecedented combination of these two threats” 
that portends a troubling imbalance in the separation of powers and checks 
and balances structure of our Constitution.2 Given the strength of these as-
saults, the Senator worries that, unless counteracted soon, they will prove 
“difªcult to dismantle” and “impossible to undo.”3 He acknowledges that 
Congress itself has been largely supine in ªghting back, and he puts forth 
some useful ideas for reforms in the way the war on terror might be con-
ducted by joint action of the two political branches and how Congress 
might more effectively pursue its “advise and consent” function with regard 
to judicial nominees.4 
We agree with much of Senator Schumer’s critique of the current 
administration’s relentless advance of the “unitary executive” and resis-
tance to cooperation with Congress. But we are also of the view that Con-
gress’s problems go much deeper. Over several decades, Congress has 
allowed the manner in which it functions to deteriorate to the point that it 
cannot muster the institutional cohesion to stand up to an overbearing 
executive, even if it possesses the desire to do so. Our forefathers, after 
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all, envisioned separation of powers as a vehicle that would pit the insti-
tutional interests of each branch against those of the others. They relied 
on each branch to use its unique powers to constrain the ambitions of the 
others. The ensuing tension was meant to be a dynamic one that would result 
in thoughtful and heavily scrutinized products from all three branches. A 
pliant sibling that will not protect its own role in the constitutional triad 
threatens the entire structure of government, the ultimate goal of which is 
the welfare and liberty of people who elect it. The concern is greater to-
day than before; the problems that government must solve are more com-
plex; and the challenges to its integrity from private special interests are 
more formidable. A strong, self-conªdent, independent legislative body 
is indispensable if the constitutional ediªce is to stand. 
We also differ to some degree with Senator Schumer’s assessment of 
the “nefarious” inºuence of the Supreme Court on congressional power. 
While its recent spate of federalism cases may deserve the widespread 
criticism it has received, we tend to be more optimistic than Senator 
Schumer on the real effect of those cases. We also see cause for optimism 
in the Court’s insistence that the other two branches engage each other in 
the war on terror. We do subscribe to his desires for a much more robust 
partnership in the nomination and conªrmation of judicial candidates, in-
cluding discrete inquiries into their general judicial philosophies and ide-
ologies. The President certainly looks at ideology when he nominates; why 
should it be off-base to the Senate when it conªrms? In the end, we need a 
watchful and independent Judiciary, but one that is also sensitive to the 
rightful domains of the other branches. Our assessment of how the Court 
is fulªlling that function is somewhat more afªrmative than the Senator’s. 
But there is no doubt we have common ground with Senator Schumer 
in our view of the erosion of congressional effectiveness in the face of a 
resolute President’s systematic pursuit of preclusive power in areas where 
the Constitution meant that power to be shared. Our Article will ªrst sur-
vey how this sorry state came to be, identify some of its myriad causes, and 
review proposals for internal reform that thoughtful commentators and Con-
gressmembers have offered to reverse the course. 
II. A Complicit Congress? 
Senator Schumer presents a comprehensive and provocative account 
of the ways in which this President has acted to make it difªcult, if not 
impossible, for Congress to fulªll its constitutional functions of informed 
legislating and oversight of the executive branch. But Congress has also 
been complicit in its own marginalization. The President’s resolute pur-
suit of his vision of a “unitary executive” with near exclusive powers in 
the realm of foreign affairs and national security, as well as bureaucratic 
control of the implementation of domestic laws, does not by itself explain or 
excuse Congress’s abject failure to fulªll its intended role as a co-equal 
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branch. We intend now to inquire into some of the causes for this default. A 
few are the accidents of history; others the byproducts of institutional 
lethargy and individual obsessions with power. 
When the Framers wrote the Constitution, although they were certainly 
aware of what James Madison termed “factions,” there were no political 
parties important enough to merit serious concern. The Framers relied upon 
the constitutional structure itself to fend off tyranny: three branches of 
government and two Houses of Congress at the federal level, plus reten-
tion of state governments as part of the overall federal scheme. John Ad-
ams’s “deepest political conviction [was] that there is safety in complex-
ity: only checks and balances prevent one class or party from tyrannizing 
everyone.”5 Madison elaborated in the Federalist Papers that each of the 
three branches would zealously guard its own interests from the intru-
sions of the other two and the Constitution would provide them with tools to 
do so.6 Implicit in both men’s conªdence in the structural solution was 
the notion that those serving in the branches would identify with and be-
stow their greatest loyalty on the branch in which they served. With the 
advent of national political parties as early as the end of the eighteenth 
century, that kind of devotion—to whatever extent it ever existed—
dissipated. The President became the symbolic and functional head of his 
party with inºuence that inªltrated every district from which the legisla-
tors were elected. Presidents needed and expected support and loyalty 
from their party members in Congress in order to accomplish their programs 
and the party’s platform.7 Members hedged their bets when conºicts oc-
curred between congressional prerogatives and presidential powers—at 
least when their own man was in ofªce. 
But checks and balances still counted for something, certainly, so long 
as one branch or even one House was controlled by a different party. In-
deed, in earlier times, impasse, rather than complicity with the Executive, 
was the dreaded outcome when a Congress dominated by one party refused 
to compromise with the President of another party. One only has to recall 
Harry Truman’s vitriolic outpourings against the “do nothing Congress” 
in 1948. There were, of course, also thirty interludes (sixty years) in the 
twentieth century during which a single party held sway over both the 
White House and Congress for all or part of a Presidential term: Democrats 
during the Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Kennedy, Carter, and Clinton 
Presidencies and Republicans during the Teddy Roosevelt, Taft, Harding, 
Hoover, and Eisenhower Presidencies. Nonetheless, the one-party “capture” 
of Congress and the Presidency that began when President George W. Bush 
took ofªce in 2001—interrupted brieºy by Senator James Jeffords’s switch 
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in party afªliation in May of that year—has prompted the most forceful 
outpourings in memory on the precipitous decline of Congress in holding 
up its part of the constitutional bargain. David Broder of the Washington 
Post recently lamented “this dismal session” just past, citing “so little 
agreement between the two Republican-controlled chambers and so little 
trust among the members that they would rather disagree and delay than 
compromise.”8 Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein document “[t]hree-hour 
votes, thousand-page-plus bills sprung on the ºoor with no notice, con-
ference reports changed in the dead of night, [and] self-executing rules that 
suppress debate along with an explosion of closed rules, are just a few of 
the practices that have become common and that are a distortion of the 
regular order.”9 
There is no dearth of important subjects left unaddressed by the last 
Congress.10 Robert Kaiser, associate editor of the Washington Post, has 
written about “[c]itizens bafºed by the House of Representatives’ alloca-
tion of its time in July—spent mostly on ºag burning, stem-cell research, 
gay marriage, the Pledge of Allegiance, religion, and gun control” while 
the elephantine specters of immigration, wireless surveillance of Ameri-
can citizens, and Iraqi disintegration languished on the sidelines.11 Ken-
neth Anderson, not a Bush-basher by any means, titled his critique “It’s 
Congress’s War, Too” and cited an impressive list of topics that, at a mini-
mum, Congress must legislate on to create the kind of comprehensive 
national terrorism policy that does not “exist merely at the discretionary 
whim of some future President.”12 Among those tasks are: deªning NSA 
surveillance limits; setting the criteria and processes for detention and 
“rendition” of uncharged detainees; monitoring the FBI’s performance of 
its new job of domestic intelligence to decide whether, as some advocate, 
we need a wholly new agency like the British MI5 to do an adequate job; 
validating the techniques that are permissible in interrogating terrorism 
suspects; and overhauling the rapacious classiªcation system as dozens 
of expert reports have recommended. 
Congress’s most thoughtful critics, however, go back well before the 
current President to cite the beginnings of disastrous changes in Congress’s 
internal workings that led to its present sad state. In their recent book The 
Broken Branch, Mann and Ornstein have delved deeply and convincingly 
into the historical roots of congressional deterioration. Internal structural 
problems have led them to worry that regardless of which party controls 
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Congress, its members will be “tempted to bend the rules and norms to 
their will as well.”13 
Although political parties have been a determinative part of Congress’s 
makeup for the past two centuries, in the past two decades not only has 
partisanship in Congress become more pronounced—Kaiser calls it “poi-
sonous”14—but it has led to a destructive arrogance on the part of major-
ity leaders toward their minority counterparts, an arrogance that began 
with Democrats in the 1980s, accelerated with the Newt Gingrich take-
over of the House in 1994, and peaked with the post-2000 Republican ma-
jorities in both Houses. Members of the minority, according to Mann and 
Ornstein, have been ruthlessly cut off from important conference com-
mittee deliberations and markups, as well as decisions on which bills or 
amendments will be brought to a vote.15 Rarely is the minority consulted 
on the bills that are pushed to the head of the line; deliberation, assumed 
by the Framers to be Congress’s forte, has suffered badly from the ab-
sence of open-mindedness, debate, and compromise. Committee chairs are 
chosen by the majority leaders, thereby cementing party ties. Most bills get 
little or no debate and are passed under closed rules not allowing amend-
ment, while major revisions are made in conference committees to which 
the minority may not have access. Votes are held open until the required 
number of majority “yeas” come in. The majority sees itself “more as a 
group of foot soldiers in the president’s army than as members of an inde-
pendent branch of government,”16 and thus has little incentive to foster a 
truly deliberative legislative process. 
For two centuries congressmembers have been afªliated with parties; 
so why the steep incline in partisanship now that threatens the integrity 
of our foremost legislative body? Some trace the heavy-handedness of 
majority party tactics in Congress to an increased ideological polariza-
tion of the parties themselves, a trend that grew out of the Vietnam War 
and the rise of the counterculture in the 1960s, the civil rights move-
ment’s unintended effect of creating a “safe Republican South,” the vig-
orously political antiabortion movement Roe v. Wade engendered, as well 
as the political rise of religious conservatism.17 All of these events may 
have contributed to an “ideological sorting” by the parties, such that their 
“platforms grew more distinctive.” Geographical mobility enabled voters 
to go “where their own kind” lived and voted, thereby creating solid one-
party enclaves.18 Those elected to Congress from one-party dominated areas 
tended to be ideologically purer than their predecessors. Conformity to the 
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party base became the price of party support. Party leaders took gerry-
mandering to new heights as a way to reward the faithful, punish the oc-
casional dissident, and ensure continued supremacy.19 
The increasing inºuence of lobbyists, especially former members of 
Congress, who are permitted access to legislators on the ºoor and who can 
implicitly if not explicitly offer political action committee support and 
money for legislators’ ªdelity, is a related but separate cause of congres-
sional decline. “Lobbying has grown massively in just the past few years,” 
achieving “a quantum leap in clout.”20 There are now twice as many regis-
tered lobbyists (30,000) as there were six years ago, and spending on federal 
lobbying has nearly doubled from $116 million per month in 1999 to 
$200 million per month in 2005. Not surprisingly, the number of “ear-
marks” for special projects has also tripled to almost 16,000 in 2005 from 
4000 in 1994. Periodic attempts to rein in lobbyists predictably fail, and the 
most recent try has been described as a “sliver of an already weak lobby-
reform bill” that “[discards] anything that would limit [Congress’s] con-
tact with lobbyists.”21 The partisan polarization and the dramatic expan-
sion of lobbyist inºuence have corrupted the internal working mode in Con-
gress. Congressmen have come to see their jobs as something to endure, not 
savor.22 
The Rules of the House have enabled this mode of operation. In making 
scheduling decisions on which bills go in what order to the ºoor, the 
Speaker consults only with majority party leaders and “selected Representa-
tives.” According to a Congressional Research Service report, “the schedul-
ing of legislation for House ºoor action is the fundamental prerogative of 
the Speaker. Individual Representatives cannot easily circumvent, inºuence, 
or reverse leadership decisions about which measures should come to the 
ºoor.”23 Controversial measures are debated under “special rules” passed 
by the majority that specify whether any amendments can be made and, if 
so, to which provisions, as well as the time for debate and for voting. The 
special rules may thus waive points of order and establish time restrictions 
that make it difªcult for individual members to get in debate time—usually 
only a few minutes.24 
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This is not to say that there have not been abuses of majority power 
in the past: for thirty-seven years a coalition of Southern Democrats and 
breakaway Republicans ruled the Senate. A revolt of the rank-and-ªle mem-
bers in the l970s produced some changes, but the threat of majority op-
pression has in recent years again come to the fore.25 The notoriously 
misnamed Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005 exempliªes the latest breakdown in Congress. The Act’s journey 
through Congress is described by Mann and Ornstein as follows: 
Working off an industry-created draft that was eight years old—
and based on a far-different ªnancial services world—blocking 
any signiªcant input from those engaged in the bankruptcy proc-
ess, denying even perfecting or corrective amendments, even 
when it was clear that they eased ºaws or gaps in the bill, and 
actively seeking to prevent any deliberative process, the leaders 
of the House and Senate obtained a law—but one that was ªlled 
with holes and problems . . . and that could bring substantial 
upheaval and injustice to large numbers of Americans. 
 
The bankruptcy bill is in some ways a special case, but it high-
lights a pattern—the eschewal of the regular order, the aban-
donment of deliberation . . . [and] the lack of concern about leg-
islative craftsmanship—that results in the production of poor laws 
and ºawed policy.26 
This dysfunctional mode has not only produced ill-conceived litiga-
tion, but has also played into the hands of an executive intent upon en-
hancing its own constitutional powers rather than seeking ways to govern 
jointly with Congress. Despite urgings from bipartisan bodies like the 
9/11 Commission and the Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction 
that oversight reform is vitally needed in the area of intelligence activi-
ties,27 virtually nothing has been done. The decline in oversight generally, 
however, had begun much earlier. Oversight hearings in the House of Repre-
sentatives went from 782 in the ªrst six months of 1983 to 287 in the ªrst 
six months of l997. In the Senate, the number of hearings dropped from 
429 to 175 in the same period.28 Timid and unsteady oversight encourages 
executive expansionism; so does the hopelessly overlapping committee 
and subcommittee jurisdiction that has plagued Congress for many dec-
ades—the Department of Homeland Security reports to eighty-eight com-
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mittees and subcommittees.29 While the Senate Intelligence Committee 
did excellent work exploring the reasoning underlying the ºawed National 
Intelligence Estimate of 2002, which preceded Congress’s authorization 
of military action against Iraq, the second phase of the Committee’s in-
quiry regarding how administration ofªcials used the intelligence given 
to them in their public addresses has languished. Only a threatened minority 
shutdown of the Senate jumpstarted the process and produced a timetable 
for the completion of this second phase of the Committee’s work. By Sep-
tember 2006, however, only two of the ªve parts had been released, with the 
most controversial part on use of WMD intelligence by policy-makers left 
until after the midterm election. The minority members of the committee 
complained loudly that the reports suffered from the majority’s refusal to go 
after critical information on the complicity of high ofªcials and from bla-
tant over-classiªcation of material that does not appear in the public ver-
sion.30 Senator Schumer complains that the President has made oversight 
impossible by withholding access to key information, but one must ask: How 
often has Congress tried to force his hand and subpoena the information it 
needs to perform its constitutional role? Is every committee in Congress 
so party-bound that it would not be worth a try? Will a new Congress assert 
itself to do so? 
Another signiªcant effect of irregular internal practices and rejection 
of minority input has been Congress’s reluctance to subject the Execu-
tive’s proposed legislation to any rigorous scrutiny or amendment. In only a 
few instances, such as the McCain Amendment banning torture and cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment of prisoners in U.S. custody,31 did Con-
gress take an active part in steering legislation away from the Executive’s 
initial position. 
Even then, the President had another chip to play. In a signing state-
ment issued when the President signed into law the legislation containing 
the McCain Amendment, the President announced that as Commander-in-
Chief he would reserve the right to waive the amendment if he deemed it 
necessary to prevent a terrorist attack. Moreover, the President stated that 
he would construe the restriction on interrogation “in a manner consistent 
with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary 
executive branch and as Commander in Chief consistent with the consti-
tutional limitations on the judicial power.”32 
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Amazingly, no recent Congress had sought to legally challenge or 
even to publicly chastise the President’s use of signing statements to di-
lute or negate its work product until a reporter broke the story about the 
extent and frequency of the use of such statements.33 Possible congressional 
responses to this misuse of signing statements are discussed below.34 
However, for a brief interlude last year, the process that unfolded re-
garding the Administration’s draft legislation on military commissions for 
trial of enemy combatants accused of war crimes gave some cause for 
hope that a small core of independent-minded legislators could reassert 
Congress’s role in formulating crucial policy. The Administration bill 
basically repeated the President’s directives creating the military com-
missions, even though the Court had found some of the practices not in 
accord with the law of war.35 A few leading Republican Senators drafted 
an alternative bill, which the Washington Post said “balance[d] profound 
and difªcult interests thoughtfully and with considerable respect both for 
the uniqueness of the current conºict and for the American tradition of 
fair trials and due process” and was “in almost all respects, superior to 
the president’s proposal.”36 Whether this initiative reºected the Presi-
dent’s low poll ratings at the time or the dawning of a new sense of insti-
tutional pride, it deserved applause and many hoped it was perhaps a har-
binger of better things to come. Sadly, however, the rebel version, though 
voted out of the Armed Services Committee, was rejected on the Senate 
ºoor in favor of the Administration bill. In effect, the Administration was 
able to recover virtually all of its original provisions intact on the ºoor, in-
cluding a drastic limitation on the availability of habeas corpus. A key issue 
then became whether the rebels would vote for the ªnal bill—and they 
did. Only one Republican Senator did not.37 Breaking party ranks still hap-
pens occasionally,38 but it is a disappearing phenomenon. There appear to be 
fewer and fewer middle-of-the-roaders who can form coalitions to support 
responsible legislation. 
Another area in which Congress has tolerated the Executive’s ener-
vation of its capacity to make meaningful contributions to the formation 
of national policy involves access to information. New classiªcation of 
documents continues at an excessive level: 14 million in 2005.39 Reclassiª-
cation of formerly unclassiªed documents has also increased under the 
 
                                                                                                                             
33
 See Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws, Boston Globe, Apr. 30, 
2006, at A1. 
34
 See infra Part III. 
35
 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2759–60 (2006). 
36
 Editorial, A Solution for Trials, Wash. Post, Sept. 9, 2006, at A16. 
37
 Senator Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island joined thirty-three Democrats in opposing 
the bill. See 152 Cong. Rec. 10, 420 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (reporting results of senate 
vote 259). 
38
 Consider, for instance, former Majority Leader Bill Frist’s votes on stem-cell research. 
39
 Elizabeth Wilson, Keeping Secrets, Wash. Post, Sept. 13, 2006, at A15. 
50 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 1 
Bush Administration.40 The criteria for release of government information 
under the Freedom of Information Act’s (“FOIA”) liberal provisions was 
changed from favoring release unless there was a foreseeable risk of harm to 
discouraging release unless there was no “sound legal basis” for with-
holding.41 The Administration has vigorously resisted disclosing informa-
tion to the public even when FOIA or the Federal Advisory Committee 
Act (“FACA”) would seem to require it.42 Congress has acceded to these 
demands for increased secrecy, legislating exceptions to the FACA for 
homeland security, Social Security, Medicare prescription drug legisla-
tion—even for the 9/11 Commission.43 Even when classiªed information is 
shared with Congress, such releases are conducted under conditions that 
reduce their efªcacy in keeping Congress informed. Security brieªngs to 
members of Congress are considered by many members as a “complete 
waste of time.”44 Congress has docilely accepted the “rules” for such brief-
ings, which often include: drastic limitations on access to the “gang of four” 
(Senate and House intelligence committee chairs and ranking members), 
no sharing of materials with staff, no taking of notes, and no reviewing of 
the basic documents underlying oral presentations. The sad result is that 
Congress, on the rare occasions when it has asserted itself under public 
pressure or in response to judicial instruction to legislate in the national se-
curity area, ªnds itself without the full knowledge to do so sensibly. 
Similarly, attempts by Congress to obtain information directly from 
executive ofªcials for either oversight or legislation have been regularly re-
fused as being beyond such ofªcials’ authority absent pre-approval from 
the President. Examples include not just security matters but ordinary 
domestic policies. Thus, the President has said he would not permit his 
subordinates to make reports to Congress on the diversion of money from 
enacted appropriations to covert operations; the use of Patriot Act au-
thorities to secretly search homes and seize private papers; and the uncen-
sored ªndings of government scientists. The farthest Congress ever got in 
this stalemate was passage of a law requiring the Attorney General to report 
to it about any policy or instance of the Department of Justice refraining 
from enforcing a federal statute. This too provoked a signing statement 
that the President had a right to withhold any information the disclosure 
of which he deemed a risk to national security or foreign relations, the 
deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance of executive 
constitutional duties.45 Again, as Senator Schumer recognizes, Congress 
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has “tools”—the power of the purse, subpoenas, GAO investigations, con-
tempt power, holdups on legislation and nominations the President wants—
to negotiate for the information it needs in the form it needs it. Thus far, 
it has not had the will to use them. 
In this part of our Article, we have explored the deplorable state of Con-
gress’s impotence in facing down the President and claiming its share of 
lawmaking and oversight authority. We have seen that Congress’s own 
method of doing business has contributed mightily to its inability to bring 
equality of arms to the contest. Its extreme partisanship has deprived it of 
the best talent and input of representatives from both parties in crafting 
responsible and fair legislation; in the process, it has managed to lose 
credibility with the people and even steady supporters of the majority 
party. Even with changing parties, serious critics fear that ingrained par-
tisanship will resurface. Polarization of parties may be a fact and preclu-
sive presidential power has and will again present itself, but at some point 
Congress as the ªrst branch must look inward and reassert itself as a 
body dedicated to the public interest—a forum where deliberation and ex-
change of views can take place and where loyalties will not be taken to 
dysfunctional ends. We can only hope that this process will begin soon. 
There are some constitutional historians who are dubious that any 
such reformation is likely.46 Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes point out 
that Madison’s notion that personal ambitions should be channeled into 
branch loyalties became highly unrealistic once political parties grew in 
size and importance. Political parties have changed the national relation-
ship of President to Congress from competitive to cooperative; it is mainly 
in times of divided government when Congress asserts itself against a 
President from the opposite party. Political scientists discovered this long 
ago, but lawyers and judges cling still to the Madisonian mirage that the 
branches will instill nonparty protectionist feelings in their members. 
Levinson and Pildes point out that although divided government was the 
norm in the second half of the twentieth century, overall unity in the po-
litical afªliation of the two branches has been the predominant status since 
the 1830s. The two parties today are more polarized than ever, with few 
signs of any change in the winds. 
Levinson and Pildes agree as well that internal rule changes in recent 
years have accentuated that polarization. What was in the 1800s a barony 
setup with committee chairs in charge of assignments became a more cen-
tralized system with the Speaker of the House, who was also the party 
leader, in charge of committee assignments, scheduling, and the rules under 
which debate would be conducted. When there is divided government, the 
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absence of a centrist bloc willing to cross party lines will make impasse 
more likely, but when there is a uniªed government, any Madisonian check 
will dissipate. Uniªed government has some advantages—more “signiª-
cant” legislation gets passed. But, the authors admit, since 1990 lawmak-
ing has become more partisan and more enactments are passed by narrow 
party-line votes. Levinson and Pildes believe that the Madisonian ideal is 
a mirage and that rather than continuing to urge ªdelity to a myth, solutions 
to the excesses of partisanship should be found in European models where 
the opposition party is given certain guaranteed prerogatives, such as to initi-
ate investigations, to obtain information from the government, even to con-
trol oversight requirements for supermajorities for some essential legisla-
tive decisions, such as conªrmation of judges and suspension of liberties 
for prolonged periods in times of national crisis. They support control of 
redistricting by independent commissions. In the end, however, their prog-
nosis is that when strong parties combine with uniªed government, the 
challenges to the Madisonian structure may be too great to overcome. 
Minimal solutions must, however, continue to be sought despite the re-
lentless pull of party pressures in relationship between the branches.47 
On balance, we ªnd substantial agreement even among these skeptics 
that things have gotten more polarized and less conducive to good legislat-
ing in recent years and that political party domination of Congress is a 
root cause. We differ perhaps in the degree to which we are ready to ac-
knowledge that this is a fait accompli and that it cannot be changed by a 
conscious determination to do so. Accordingly, we turn now to explore how 
that change might come about. 
III. Restoring the Balance 
A. Signing Statement Reform 
One of the more notorious current affronts to the balance of power 
between the President and Congress is frequently discussed under the head-
ing of signing statements. This heading refers to the practice whereby the 
President signs a bill into law despite constitutional reservations about one 
or more of its provisions. The President then issues a signing statement 
accompanying the new law in which he expresses his constitutional ob-
jection. Controversy arises when this expression includes an indication 
that the President will refuse to enforce the objectionable provisions of 
the new law.48 
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These non-enforcement signing statements can operate to undermine 
Congress’s role in the legislative process. For example, the Bush Admini-
stration threatened to veto any legislation containing language that would 
prohibit “cruel, inhuman and degrading” treatment of detainees. Congress 
passed the McCain Amendment nonetheless. Publicly, President Bush ac-
quiesced to Congress, but when he signed the bill into law, the signing 
statement included a constitutional objection to the McCain Amendment. 
In such a circumstance, a signing statement can have a practical effect that 
is quite similar to that of a veto, but is not subject to any of the checks that 
normally constrain the President’s veto power.49 Congress’s real power to 
legislate is thus diminished and the President’s is correspondingly increased. 
The practice of issuing such non-enforcement signing statements has 
been especially problematic in the Bush Administration. Previous Admini-
strations have issued such statements, but in numbers dwarfed by the cur-
rent Administration.50 These statements are also qualitatively different 
because they do not directly express an intention not to enforce a new 
law. Rather, they direct the executive branch to interpret the new law to 
avoid the Administration’s constitutional objection. While other Presidents 
have issued signing statements asserting an intention to interpret the new 
law in a particular way, President Bush’s signing statements typically do 
not elaborate beyond identifying the general grounds of the constitutional 
objection. In the case of the McCain Amendment, for example, the sign-
ing statement asserted that the provision would be interpreted consistent 
with the President’s power as commander in chief and as head of the uni-
tary executive branch.51 The statement neither noted how the McCain 
Amendment might be inconsistent with those powers nor described how 
the McCain Amendment would be re-interpreted. 
These vague and general statements raise two additional problems. 
First, they do not allow Congress an opportunity to respond effectively. If 
Congress were alerted to the precise constitutional objection, it might 
agree with the President’s interpretation and amend the law accordingly. 
In the alternative, it might disagree and make its meaning clear. Such a 
clear statement would prevent the President from validly invoking the avoid-
ance canon. As applied in courts, this canon directs a judge who is con-
fronted with an ambiguous statute that could reasonably be interpreted in 
several ways to prefer the reasonable interpretation that avoids a constitu-
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tional problem over a reasonable interpretation that implicates a constitu-
tional problem.52 By eliminating any ambiguity, the predicate for the avoid-
ance canon is not satisªed, and the clear meaning must be followed or 
set-aside as unconstitutional. 
Second, vague and general signing statements leave opaque the real 
constitutional basis for the President’s objection. Insofar as these objections 
are based on well-settled constitutional principles and Supreme Court hold-
ings, the threat to congressional power is minimized. Where, for example, 
the President objects to a legislative veto, there is no doubt that the ob-
jection is well-taken and little basis for concern that the President is ex-
panding his power at the expense of Congress.53 But where the objection 
is grounded in a highly contested theory of the Constitution’s meaning, then 
the President might use signing statement objections to augment his own 
power. President Bush has frequently referred in signing statements to the 
unitary executive theory of presidential power—eighty-two times in his ªrst 
term alone.54 While this theory has at best slim support in Supreme Court 
precedent,55 it continues to provide the legal justiªcation for many of the 
Bush Administration’s programs.56 If the President combines such an ex-
pansive and contested reading of the Constitution with the avoidance canon, 
the President will easily ªnd objectionable provisions and just as easily 
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ªnd the grounds to “ªx” those problems through interpretation. By draft-
ing the signing statement in a general and vague way, the President avoids 
scrutiny of the underlying legal theory. This poses a serious threat to the 
ability of Congress to retain its primary role in the legislative process. 
The threat to Congress’s constitutional role can be diminished by mak-
ing public the legal theories that support the President’s vague and gen-
eral signing statements. At present, such statements are protected from 
disclosure by the deliberative process exception to the Freedom of In-
formation Act.57 Congress can, and should, respond to this signing state-
ment problem in one of several different ways. One way would be by enact-
ing legislation making legal memoranda that describe constitutional ob-
jections found in signing statements subject to mandatory disclosure 
upon request—not only by Congress but by the public at large. 
Alternatively, Congress can mandate that such legal memoranda be 
disclosed to Congress upon the issuance of the signing statement. We believe 
that the best way to accomplish this reform would be to amend FOIA’s ex-
emption ªve, which provides an exemption from disclosure for delibera-
tive process documents and for attorney work product. None of the ration-
ales for protecting attorney work product applies to the legal memos pro-
duced in advance of a signing statement.58 Moreover, as long as mandatory 
disclosure is limited to those memos or parts of memos that provide the ac-
tual basis for a signing statement that is actually issued, none of the con-
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cerns for chilling effects that support the deliberative process exemption 
will apply. The additional beneªt of proceeding by amendment to FOIA’s 
exemption ªve is that this approach will leave available the other catego-
ries of exemption. Thus, for example, the Administration would still be able 
to withhold legal memos or portions thereof that deal with classiªed national 
security information.59 
B. Internal Executive Branch Checks 
The executive branch has long been structured to create internal checks 
against presidential overreaching.60 Senator Schumer’s paper appropriately 
highlights some of these internal restraints and the ways in which the Bush 
Administration has politicized them.61 We wish to highlight an additional 
internal check: the Ofªce of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) within the Depart-
ment of Justice. That ofªce is charged with the tasks of resolving legal 
conºicts between agencies of the executive branch and of giving typi-
cally binding legal advice to President and the agencies of the executive 
branch. In these capacities, OLC promotes adherence to the rule of law, 
which in turn serves as a constraint on executive branch action. OLC has 
played this role in administrations of both political parties.62 
Sometimes, however, the role of OLC has shifted to one in which 
that ofªce tends to act as an advocate for the most expansive vision of ex-
ecutive power.63 At its worst, this model of proceeding devolves into pro-
viding ºimsy legal rationalizations for an Administration’s preferred course 
of action. The most notorious example of this is the so-called OLC “Tor-
ture Memo,”64 which Anthony Lewis has aptly described as most closely 
akin to “the advice of a mob lawyer to a maªa don on how to skirt the 
law and stay out of prison.”65 
This dispute has spawned a rich literature on the proper role of OLC 
and of government lawyers more generally. The major disagreement is over 
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whether OLC should play an advocate’s role or a more detached role that 
follows a judicial model.66 We strongly support the latter view.67 Under a 
judicial model, OLC would assume the role of assessing the legality of 
proposed courses of action. As a result, OLC would occasionally be forced 
to tell the Administration that its preferred course of conduct was impermis-
sible. By comparison, if OLC performs an advocate’s role—as practiced in 
connection with the advice given in the so-called Torture Memo—it would 
simply provide a legal justiªcation for whatever course of action an ad-
ministration wished to take.68 
Certainly, the Constitution imposes upon the President the duty to 
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”69 OLC can and should 
play a central role in ensuring that the President fulªlls this duty. When OLC 
takes on an advocate’s role, however, it tends—as the Torture Memo so 
vividly demonstrates—to weaken the forces restraining the President to ful-
ªll his “take care” obligation. 
There is no simple formulation that can guarantee that OLC will per-
form its role properly. Nevertheless, there are commitments that the of-
ªce can undertake that will buttress its mission. In this connection, we 
advocate adoption of the “Principles to Guide the Ofªce of Legal Counsel” 
that have been urged by a group of former lawyers in that ofªce.70 These 
guidelines are unavoidably capacious, too much to be an appropriate sub-
ject for legislation. Nevertheless, Congress can and should play a role in 
enforcing them. First, the Senate should demand that anyone nominated to 
head OLC commit to following the principles. This demand should also be 
made of future Attorneys General. Second, the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees should conduct oversight to make sure that OLC lives up to 
the guidelines and promotes the rule of law within the executive branch. 
Such oversight should be conducted in such a way as to avoid improper 
interference in speciªc, ongoing matters. Congress has in the past engaged 
in oversight of OLC’s conduct.71 Thus, it is appropriate for Congress to de-
termine whether OLC is being politicized or to seek examples of whether 
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and how it is conforming to the guidelines. Were Congress, in the guise of 
conducting oversight, to seek to insert itself into the advice-giving process 
for ongoing matters, however, it would cross a line with serious constitu-
tional implications. 
C. Reform Within Congress 
Restoring Congress as a full-ºedged partner in constitutional gov-
ernance may require concerted action on three fronts: internal reform by 
Congress in its own practices, periodic arousal of the public to “throw the 
rascals out,” and a culture of mutual restraint that includes the President 
as well as Congress. “There is no quick ªx for a dysfunctional institution.”72 
But there have been occasions in the past when reform-minded members 
successfully rebelled against majority party abuse of the legislative proc-
ess—and it could happen again, especially now that critical numbers of 
new members have entered Congress. “A sense of fair play, of balanced 
rules that cover everybody, and of concern for the very integrity of the insti-
tution would go a long way” toward energizing a genuine reform movement 
within Congress.73 
One simple aid to genuine deliberations would be for Congress to adopt 
an ordinary work week—Monday to Friday—for a speciªed number of 
weeks per year, rather than the frenzied late Tuesday to midday-Thursday 
schedule currently in place.74 The current schedule reduces to a minimum 
time for interaction and development of personal relationships and time 
for debate and deliberation. In 2006, only seventy-one days were sched-
uled for votes in the House; all told, only ninety-seven calendar days saw 
votes, the lowest number in sixty years.75 Additionally, there were less than 
half the number of committee meetings held in the 2000s as in the 1960s, 
and Congress was in session only 250 days per two-year Congress com-
pared to 323 days in the 1960s and 1970s.76 The 109th Congress was in 
session only 100 days, “the fewest number . . . in our lifetimes.”77 There 
should be set periods of at least a few days between the time a bill is re-
ported and debate on it begins, so there is some chance for members to 
read it. However, as it is now, in the feverish close-of-session days, “must-
pass” legislation that has languished for months, including essential au-
thorization and appropriation bills, are rushed to the ºoor with last-minute 
provisions of all kinds attached. Bills are consolidated into omnibus tomes 
of thousands of pages with undiscoverable riches for particular lawmaker 
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interests tucked covertly into their folds. At one point in last year’s ses-
sion, the Speaker of the House threatened to kill the defense authoriza-
tion bill unless a court security and an anti-immigrant bill were tacked on. 
Many last-minute tack-on measures have not had hearings or prior debate 
at all.78 
In 2005, several House members—Representatives David Obey, Barney 
Frank, David Price, and Tom Allen—proposed a reform package that 
would end the practices of “huge bills, with nefarious special interest riders 
attached, rushed to the ºoor after midnight so Members and the people 
can’t read them.”79 Under the proposed reform, printed copies of legisla-
tion must be available to House members for twenty-four hours ahead of 
ºoor consideration unless two-thirds of the House votes to waive that 
requirement. The reform package also contained a prohibition on the House 
adjourning a session if it has not conducted twenty or more weeks with at 
least one recorded vote or quorum call on four of the ªve work days.80 
The horror stories of unread legislation are legion. In 2004, the House 
approved a double-sided, 1600-page, $388 billion “omnibus” spending 
bill within hours after it was made available to members, with a clause in 
it permitting the House Appropriation chair and staff to read citizens’ 
private tax returns.81 Notably, the House already has a three-day waiting 
period, but the Rules Committee can and does waive the requirement if a 
majority agrees; waivers were passed forty-four times in two years.82 Wait-
ing periods have been reduced to three hours for a 1200-page defense 
authorization bill and eight hours for an 816-page energy bill.83 In the 108th 
Congress, the Medicare prescription drug, energy, and defense authoriza-
tion bills, totaling nearly 3000 pages and costing potentially $1 trillion, 
were passed after a collective total of forty-eight hours before they went to 
the ºoor.84 
A number of other simple procedural rules could be established to 
ensure that the minority is included in deliberations and that outside inºu-
ences on member voting are limited. Pre-established times for voting should 
be honored, not extended at will to bring about a predetermined conclu-
sion. Conference committees should not exclude any opposition members, 
and items not previously discussed in either House should not be added 
in conference. Earmarks for individual pet projects should be sharply cur-
tailed. A recent rule change in the House requiring members to disclose 
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their sponsorship of such earmarks is a pallid improvement. Members’ 
receipt of favors from lobbyists and other special interest groups should 
be restricted and subject to heightened disclosure requirements. These 
sound like simple reforms, but they could create a climate and atmosphere 
far more conducive to consultation and deliberation than exists at present.85 
Such changes may be hard to come by even in a new Congress. The 
disclosure requirements for identifying sponsorship of earmarks “ended 
the prospect for a more sweeping overhaul of federal lobbying laws this 
year” that would have limited contacts with and perks from lobbyists.86 
The earmark disclosure rule was widely viewed as a “passable way to ad-
dress voter unrest over the scandals” that permeated the session, and a lead-
ing majority member disparaged it as a “trivial pursuit.”87 In a biting cri-
tique of the new rule, the Washington Post queried: 
How modest—pathetic would be a more appropriate term—is 
the House change? Henceforth members will be required to dis-
close their separate sponsorship of certain earmarks, and by no 
means all of them. Beyond this limited disclosure: nothing. No 
provision for an up-or-down vote on such spending. No prohibi-
tion on earmarks to beneªt lawmakers’ relatives. No limitation 
on last-minute additions that offer no opportunity for scrutiny or 
debate.88 
Despite the front-page scandals involving members and lobbyists, 
the Republican House leadership has resisted efforts by its own Ethics 
Committee to conduct serious inquiries. In response to the Committee’s ad-
monishment of former majority leader Tom DeLay, the leadership changed 
the Republican caucus rules so he could continue as leader even under 
indictment and also ªred the Committee’s chair and replaced several of 
its members and staffers. The “gutted” committee retreated quietly into 
oblivion, and lobbying reform was ultimately put back into its “partisan 
straightjacket.”89 
There is, however, some cause for hope. Even before the election, 
Democrats had announced plans—if in control—to revise House Rules to 
allow the opposition party to offer amendments and to sit on conference 
committees from which they have up to now been systematically excluded, 
as well as to ban lobbyist ªnanced gifts and trips.90 
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The Obey-Frank “reform package” noted earlier would, inter alia, 
stop any recorded vote from staying open for more than twenty minutes 
without the consent of both majority and minority ºoor managers and lead-
ers. It would prevent “special rules” from changing the text of a commit-
tee-reported bill without opportunity for amendment back to the original 
and would require a formal open meeting of a committee on all differences 
between the two Houses—and a formal vote on those difference—before 
a conference committee report could be considered. No conference report 
could contain items materially different from those voted upon in the open 
committee session. 
Then-Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi has also proposed a Minority Bill 
of Rights for a “bipartisan administration of the House and for the regular 
democratic order for legislation,” which mandates regular consultation 
among both parties’ leaders on scheduling of bills and regular meetings be-
tween Chairs and ranking members of committees.91 The minority party 
would have control of one-third of committee budgets and ofªce space. On 
the ºoor, bills would be subject to a full amendment process to permit sub-
stitutes. Floor votes would be limited to ªfteen minutes. The document 
states that “[n]o vote would be held open in order to manipulate the out-
come.” Conference committee members would be given advance notice of 
meetings far enough in advance to permit their attendance. Additionally, 
Pelosi has signaled she intends to propose new House Rules to bar mem-
bers from accepting gifts and trips from lobbyists and to deny ºoor privi-
leges to former members turned lobbyists.92 
There are, however, those who believe reform will only come when 
American voters rise up and demand better of their representatives by reject-
ing at the polls those who fall short.93 It should be an upbeat observation 
in a democracy that citizens at the polls are the most likely agent of change. 
It remains to be seen whether the recent midterm elections reºecting the 
unpopularity of the Iraq war, the Katrina ªasco, and ethical lapses have 
shaken up parties and candidates and trimmed “ideological sails.” Have 
voters in fact sent a message that they want deliberative Congresspersons 
who spend enough time in Washington to get policy right and who treas-
ure their own independence in vital matters? According to David Broder: 
“We need an infusion of men and women committed to Congress as an 
institution to engage with each other seriously enough to search out and 
ªnd areas of agreement and to join hands with each other to insist on the 
rights and prerogatives of the nation’s legislature, not make it simply an 
echo chamber of presidential politics.”94 
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In the end, of course, it takes two to do the constitutional tango. De-
spite the currents in their favor, American Presidents should be as devoted as 
Congress to the constitutional schemata and to reaching out to Congress 
to develop mutually satisfactory solutions to incredibly complex prob-
lems.95 A recent example, perhaps borne out of necessity, but worthy none-
theless, is the manner in which President Clinton cooperated with a Re-
publican Congress after 1996 to pass welfare reform, access to health care, 
and a balanced budget. A President who sincerely declares as part of his 
campaign for ofªce that he desires to work with Congress in solving the big 
agenda that awaits him—and acts accordingly—has vast potential to alter 
the present unsatisfactory dynamics of separation of powers.96 
The constitutional liability of a dispirited and rancorous Congress in 
the current world is far greater than in earlier times. Congress’s responsi-
bilities have ballooned to encompass virtually every aspect of citizens’ lives, 
as well as life or death decisions about the survival of the nation as a whole. 
Congress’s role as the First Branch means that if it fails to function fairly 
and efªciently and to work cooperatively with the President, the future of 
the nation will teeter. The past years have not been augers of conªdence 
in that relationship. One can only hope that the dire nature of current com-
plaints and past failures will energize reform on all three fronts. 
IV. The Judiciary 
Senator Schumer’s article aptly recognizes the central role the judi-
ciary plays in the story of how the President is seeking to expand his 
power.97 But we think Senator Schumer errs in casting the Court as a full-
time villain.98 Instead, we think the judiciary has, in some areas, played 
an active and positive role in upholding the Constitution’s structure, and 
that it should be encouraged to continue to do so. 
A. The Implications of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Jurisprudence 
for Separation of Powers 
Senator Schumer faults the Court for undermining congressional 
power.99 In doing so, his argument continues, the Court impairs Congress 
in terms of its ability to act as a counterbalance to presidential power. He 
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relies on the federalism decisions that the Supreme Court has issued over 
the dozen years since its decision in United States v. Lopez.100 Because 
these cases scale back congressional power under the Commerce Clause 
and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Schumer claims that Congress 
is a less powerful institution and less capable of constraining the expan-
sion of presidential power.101 
There are two problems with this argument. First, the federalism revo-
lution that Lopez ushered in is still in progress. At this point, it is impos-
sible to say where the doctrine as to congressional power will settle. On 
the cases that have been decided, it is clear that Congress retains a great 
deal of authority. Perhaps most signiªcantly, the Court has steadfastly re-
fused to limit Congress’s power under the Spending Clause.102 Thus, Con-
gress may continue to make state eligibility to receive federal funds—
which have become absolutely vital to the functioning of state government—
conditional upon compliance with federal mandates. Moreover, Congress’s 
substantive regulatory power under the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth 
Amendment remain extensive. After Lopez was decided, Congress amended 
the Gun-Free School Zones Act to add a jurisdictional hook that, as a prac-
tical matter, leaves the law co-extensive with the statute invalidated in 
Lopez.103 Similarly, after the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne 
v. Flores,104 Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutional-
ized Person Act,105 which applies heightened religious protections to a 
virtually identical spectrum of activities as had the unconstitutional Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act.106 While we agree with the doctrinal criti-
cisms of these Supreme Court decisions found in Senator Schumer’s piece,107 
it is too early to tell how much of a practical limit these decisions will im-
pose on federal power.108 In this connection, it is noteworthy that the more 
recent trend has been to uphold power as the Court has retreated from Lopez, 
Boerne, and United States v. Morrison109 in cases such as Gonzales v. 
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Raich,110 Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,111 Tennessee 
v. Lane,112 United States v. Georgia,113 and Central Virginia Community Col-
lege v. Katz.114 
Second, and more fundamentally, the federalism cases do not impli-
cate the balance of power between the President and Congress in the way 
we have been discussing. It is tempting to conclude that, because the 
Constitution poises Congress and the President as rivals for power, feder-
alism decisions that weaken Congress necessarily must strengthen the Ex-
ecutive. This conceptualization of the federalism cases, however, may not 
always be descriptively accurate. Rather, in those cases, the Court limited 
not only the power of Congress, but the power of the federal government 
as a whole. It is true that Congress may not legislate the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act,115 for example. But it is also true that the President may not 
enforce the Act. Thus, the ambit of Congress’s legislative power is lim-
ited, but the ambit of the President’s corresponding prosecutorial and 
investigative powers are correspondingly limited. 
The series of cases invalidating the New Deal may provide a better 
example of this principle.116 There, Congress’s power to establish regula-
tory regimes in response to the Great Depression was curtailed, but those 
decisions also impacted presidential power in two important respects. First, 
some of the statutes delegated expansive authority to the President; thus, 
presidential power was severely limited as a consequence of decisions in-
validating those statutes.117 Second, the invalidated statutes were drafted 
by and identiªed heavily with the Roosevelt Administration itself. Invali-
dation of such statutes weakened the President’s ability to execute his policy 
agenda. Presidents care deeply about their legislative agendas, and re-
strictions on the ability of the federal government to legislate may strike 
at the President in this capacity along with Congress. As Roosevelt’s 
“court-packing” plan attests, such invalidations occasionally provoke 
serious constitutional confrontations between President and Court. 
In the arena of separation of powers cases—those that actually impli-
cate the balance of power between the President and Congress—we see 
the courts as playing on the whole a positive role, although their record is 
mixed. As we discuss, the courts have recently stood up to the President 
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speciªcally to reinforce the role that Congress is meant to play in our consti-
tutional structure. For this, they deserve a measure of acclaim. 
B. Rating the Court’s Performance as a Constitutional Umpire 
In addition to Congress, the judiciary stands as an important check 
against the possibility of presidential abuse of power. Against this back-
drop, calls for heightened judicial deference to the President on matters 
of foreign and military affairs are deeply troubling. Indeed, excessive defer-
ence has yielded some of the darkest chapters in the history of our judici-
ary. For example, in Korematsu v. United States,118 the Supreme Court was 
far too willing to defer in its understanding of the requirements of Due Proc-
ess and Equal Protection to the considered judgment of the President and 
military leaders. As a result, the Supreme Court upheld the internment of 
Japanese Americans based on what turns out to have been no more than the 
racist assumptions of the military commander charged with securing the 
West Coast during World War II.119 
While Korematsu is the most notorious example of excessive defer-
ence, it is by no means unique. In United States v. Reynolds,120 the Supreme 
Court upheld the government’s assertion of a state secrets privilege to defeat 
a liability lawsuit against the Defense Department. The government as-
serted that complying with discovery in the case would require the disclo-
sure of state secrets.121 Because there was a reasonable likelihood that the 
material sought through discovery would contain such secrets, the Supreme 
Court deferred to the government’s assertion without conducting in camera 
inspection or otherwise seeking to verify the assertion.122 It turns out, now 
that the relevant documents have been declassiªed, that there were no state 
secrets in any of the material sought in discovery.123 The Bush Administra-
tion has come to rely extensively on this precedent to assert state secrets 
immunity from all manner of challenges to its secret anti-terror programs.124 
So far the record is mixed: the Government in the lower courts has been able 
to block judicial accountability for executive actions with serious civil 
liberties implications in most cases involving wireless surveillance or even 
rendition. We believe that modern courts should treat these claims for 
total immunity more incredulously than did the Reynolds Court and ener-
getically seek to preserve maximum room for judicial scrutiny where na-
tional security is not clearly at risk. 
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The Supreme Court has provided guidance as to the constitutional sepa-
ration of powers between Congress and the President in the realm of for-
eign affairs and national security. There is nothing new about this role; some 
of the most important early Supreme Court decisions involved questions 
regarding the extent to which the President’s use of the military was sub-
ject to legal constraint.125 What is most striking to a modern reader is how 
little hesitation the Court had in reminding the President that he was sub-
ject to congressional restriction even in the conduct of war operations.126 
Since its landmark decision in the Steel Seizure Case,127 the Supreme 
Court has adhered to the tripartite framework set forth in Justice Robert 
Jackson’s concurring opinion.128 Under that framework, the Court regards 
the President’s power as “at its highest ebb” when the President acts pur-
suant to statutory authorization. At the opposite pole is the situation where 
the President in violation of an express statutory command, in which case 
the President’s action may be upheld only if the constitution grants the 
President preclusive power to act in the area. That is, the President may dis-
regard Congress only when the Constitution grants the President the exclu-
sive power to act and withholds from Congress any authority to address the 
subject. The paradigmatic example is the use of the pardon power. Between 
these polar cases lies a “zone of twilight” wherein the President acts without 
express congressional approval or disapproval. Resolution of such cases de-
pends upon “contemporary imponderables.” Subsequent elaboration, as well 
as the treatment of the Steel Seizure controversy itself, has directed atten-
tion to the legislative context in which the President operates. Where that 
context evinces a “general tenor of . . . acceptance” of presidential action, 
the Court will be inclined to approve the President’s action.129 Where, how-
ever, the legislative context evinces a tenor of disapproval, the Court will be 
inclined to invalidate the President’s action. The Jackson framework em-
phasizes the importance of executive-legislative coordination and evinces 
a deep skepticism of unilateral executive action. 
Unfortunately, the current Administration’s tendentious view of presi-
dential authority—that the President holds expansive inherent powers and 
that these inherent powers are not subject to legal constraint—has be-
come commonplace in recent discourse regarding presidential power.130 In a 
sense, this should come as no surprise. Justice Jackson had observed this 
tendency among advocates of presidential power: 
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Loose and irresponsible use of adjectives colors all non-legal and 
much legal discussion of presidential powers. “Inherent” pow-
ers, “implied” powers, “incidental” powers, “plenary” powers, 
“war” powers, and “emergency” powers are used, often inter-
changeably and without ªxed or ascertainable meanings. . . . 
The claim of inherent and unrestricted presidential powers has long 
been a persuasive dialectical weapon in political controversy. 
While it is not surprising that counsel should grasp support from 
such unadjudicated claims of power, a judge cannot accept self-
serving press statements . . . .131 
Justice Jackson’s opinion goes on to reject this approach to the interpre-
tation of presidential power—not because the President lacks powers not 
speciªcally mentioned in the Constitution’s text, but because it is too 
extravagant to claim that these powers are illimitable. Where Congress also 
has textually expressed power, the existence of a concurrent presidential 
power does not evict Congress from the ªeld. To take a less freighted 
example, it is now well-established that the President enjoys an inherent 
power to remove executive branch ofªcers. That power is not expressly 
granted by the Constitution’s text. Rather it is a power that inheres in the 
nature of the executive and ªnds further support from the President’s 
constitutional authority to make appointments.132 Yet it is similarly well-
established that Congress’s authority to create and deªne federal ofªces 
allows it to imbue executive branch ofªcers with independence and, to this 
end, to severely limit the President’s inherent removal authority, even over 
some of the nation’s most consequential ofªcers.133 As Justice Jackson 
observed in Steel Seizure, it is not at all surprising that the Administra-
tion would seek to assert broad inherent powers, but the judiciary need 
not accept these assertions. 
The Administration has not conªned its arguments to political con-
troversies. It has repeatedly offered its expansive view of inherent presi-
dential powers to the Supreme Court. Following Justice Jackson, the Su-
preme Court has rejected the Administration’s claims of power. In Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld,134 for example, the Administration argued that the President 
held inherent authority to designate anyone, including a United States 
citizen, an enemy combatant and to hold such a designee indeªnitely and 
incommunicado, subject to no judicial review of the President’s designa-
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tion.135 The Court rejected this claim. As Justice O’Connor wrote, citing 
Steel Seizure, “a state of war is not a blank check for the President.”136 In-
deed, Justice O’Connor asserted that the judiciary would “play a necessary 
role in maintaining this delicate balance of governance, serving as an 
important judicial check on the Executive’s discretion in the realm of deten-
tions.”137 The Court then went about describing in general terms the sort 
of process to which citizens are entitled, but left the important work of 
fashioning such a process to the Congress.138 In essence, then, the Court re-
gards itself as a check, but one that operates mainly by enforcing Con-
gress’s role in establishing the legal regime through which the President 
must operate.139 
These issues returned to the Supreme Court last term in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld.140 President Bush asserted inherent authority to establish mili-
tary tribunals to try enemy combatants for violations of the laws of war. 
The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the President 
has such authority. The Supreme Court held that treaty and statutes had 
made some provision for the use of military commissions, and that the 
President was bound to comply with those legal constraints. In other words, 
until Congress said otherwise, the military commissions must conform to 
the requirements of the Geneva Convention and the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice. The Court thus necessarily held that the President’s power 
is subject to legal constraints.141 The Court also emphasized the role that 
Congress plays in establishing the legal framework for the conduct of 
military commissions. Thus, again, the Court acted as a check on presi-
dential power primarily by reinforcing the role of Congress. 
Because the Court has continued to adhere to Justice Jackson’s frame-
work, it has continued to emphasize the role of Congress as a check on 
presidential power. The judiciary, then, will only be as effective a check 
on presidential power as is Congress itself. The detention of enemy com-
batants and the procedures of military commissions is a vivid illustration 
of this point. After Hamdi and Hamdan, Congress has enacted sweeping 
legislation that largely authorizes the President to do what he has been 
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doing.142 The legislation goes further to grant the executive branch broad 
insulation from judicial review and immunity for past actions.143 If the 
content of our protections from presidential powers is to be supplied not 
by the courts but by Congress, all of the reasons set forth above to doubt 
Congress’s ªtness for this role will ultimately serve to undermine the judici-
ary as a check on presidential power as well. 
C. Congress and the Courts: A Mutually Dependent Relationship 
Although Senator Schumer feels that the courts have been half of a 
one-two punch to the legislative branch, it should be noted that the courts 
too have taken the brunt of Presidential assertions of exclusive power, 
particularly in the “war on terror.” In that area, Congress has partnered 
with the Executive to strip the courts of traditional powers to guard the 
liberty of those who seek their intervention. Congress does, of course, have 
constitutional power to deªne the jurisdiction of inferior courts and to regu-
late their procedures. In recent times, it has used that power to strip the 
federal courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction for any alien, inside or out-
side the United States, designated as an “unlawful enemy combatant” by 
an executive military tribunal in a hearing devoid of traditional due proc-
ess protections.144 Other jurisdiction-stripping bills on subjects like gay 
marriages and Pledge of Allegiance suits are still pending.145 Congress has 
even gone so far as to tell federal judges they may not consult foreign or 
international sources in interpreting Common Article Three of the Ge-
neva Convention in cases heard in civilian courts.146 It has also banned 
the invocation of treaty rights by litigants in federal courts.147 In the past, 
Congress and the courts have in most cases worked out a modus vivendi 
that was more comfortable. Congress has been admirably reticent, for in-
stance, after the ªrst century of coexistence, to use its impeachment power 
to punish judges for unpopular opinions.148 
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Congress needs independent judges to preserve congressional power 
and to enforce demands for information from a recalcitrant executive. It 
is true, of course, that in the past the Courts have been understandably reluc-
tant to decide disputes between the two political branches, in part be-
cause of their own vulnerability as the “least dangerous branch.” They have 
erected a series of barriers to taking such disputes to court in the form of 
standing requirements, bans against “political questions,” and ripeness 
standards. As Justice Powell has cautioned: “The Judicial Branch should 
not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between the President 
and Congress” until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse—a 
term that remains undeªned to this day.149 But one must ask: why should 
a duly authorized oversight committee, when met with executive imper-
viousness to its demands, not issue a subpoena and ask the court to en-
force it? To our knowledge this has been threatened only once in recent 
Congresses.150 Although the Court’s doctrine on standing for Congress mem-
bers to sue the Executive is stringent, standing doctrine is a creature of 
the Court, albeit with constitutional roots in the “case or controversy” re-
quirement of Article III judicial power. It should be capable of adjustment to 
meet the genuine needs of another branch to perform its functions.151 
Congress also needs an independent judiciary to interpret its laws as 
they were intended to be interpreted. Many of the problematic interpreta-
tions reºected in the numerous signing statements must ultimately be 
challenged in court if the laws’ original purposes are to be fulªlled. Con-
gress and the courts are natural allies in this sense, and Congress’s power 
to affect the general welfare often depends upon the third branch. 
Unfortunately, the relationship of Congress and the courts at times 
manifests itself in self-destructive ways. In the views of some commenta-
tors, Congress has become “addicted to judicial review.”152 When Congress-
persons have tried unsuccessfully to change a bill so as to remove what 
they consider unconstitutional provisions, they end up voting for the bill 
anyway, proclaiming that “the court will clean it up.”153 This use of courts 
as “[a] constitutional chambermaid . . . that exist[s] to clean up after Con-
gress smashes the room” is an unremitting disaster for separation of powers 
where each branch has a duty to conform to the Constitution.154 The no-
tion that there is a judicial outªelder to catch the bad throws as well as to 
provide political cover for risky votes contributes to sloppy legislating. 
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Congress wants and deserves independent judges who will umpire 
constitutional disputes in a fair and sensitive manner, will interpret laws 
as Congress passed them, and will, as a last resort, aid Congress in asserting 
its constitutional prerogatives. And Congress, in fact, has a valid constitu-
tional tool to help secure such judges: its “advise and consent” function, 
discussed at length by Senator Schumer. We agree that ideological tilts 
are legitimate areas for conªrmation inquiries; we are indeed surprised that 
the extensive list of questions he posits rarely, if ever, gets asked. In truth, 
Democratic and Republican nominees alike have set a precedent that they 
will only answer such questions if they have already opined on them pub-
licly. But that precedent does not merit indeªnite tenure, and where no 
commitments or answers to speciªc future cases are asked for, Senator 
Schumer’s list is a good place to begin more targeted and forceful conªrma-
tion hearings. 
This is an area in which the Senate has not heretofore distinguished 
itself.155 Friends as well as critics noted the lack of coordination among 
Democrats on the Judiciary Committee and among the Senate leadership 
in their questioning of Samuel Alito and John Roberts. Indeed, there is con-
sensus that the Republicans displayed far better coordination in these 
conªrmations hearings. Unfocused and ad hoc questioning by members fails 
not only their own branch in protecting its prerogative, but also their duty 
to educate the watching public on the crucial issues at stake in the nomi-
nation. 
The Framers ªtted federal judges securely into their checks and bal-
ances regime. They would be nominated by the President, but they had to 
be conªrmed by the Senate. Dubbed the weakest branch, dependent on Con-
gress for grants of jurisdiction as well as money to operate, the federal 
judiciary has traditionally survived and ºourished because of the kind of 
mutual restraint between it and Congress that we yearn to see between 
the President and Congress. Early attempts by Congress to impeach judges 
on the basis of disagreements with their rulings failed and have not been 
seriously pursued since.156 Jurisdiction-stripping bills have been introduced 
from time to time, but only sometimes—as in the case of prisoner suits and, 
lately, detainee habeas corpus actions—have they succeeded. There are 
also the recurrent media attacks on judges, some instigated by congress-
persons or presidential candidates, decrying “imperious” or “lawless” judges 
whose rulings do not please the speaker. Few if any of these measures in the 
past have presented real dangers to judges’ independence, although there 
is always the risk that if you throw around a libel long enough it may stick 
in the public perception. 
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In the past few years, however, a new threat has emerged in which 
Congress has allied itself with the President in cabining judicial power. 
The President has taken the tack of marginalizing the judiciary, trying to 
keep it away from reviewing signiªcant executive actions, especially in 
the area of national security. The Court, as we have seen, has rebuffed sev-
eral of those attempts in the Hamdi, Hamdan, and Rasul cases. But the 
fate of other attempts, such as the state secrets doctrine, remains unsettled. 
In the area of foreign affairs, the Bush Administration has argued strenu-
ously and mostly successfully against courts’ interpreting treaty provi-
sions, such as the Geneva Conventions, as conferring a cause of action 
upon individual litigants. Congress, regretfully, has legislated away judi-
cial review after Supreme Court decisions opened it up by denying detainees 
habeas corpus and other time-honored remedies. Thus, a key question in 
the future of separation of powers may well be the attitude of the judges 
toward the sharing of constitutional governance—whether they, like Con-
gress, will accede passively to presidential assertions using the familiar 
doctrine of deference to the policymaking organs or whether they will asser-
tively monitor the boundaries between the branches, continue to defend 
their own turf, and rise to the defense of civil liberties. So far the record 
is mixed, but somewhat positive. 
Until the latter part of the last century, judges were nominated prin-
cipally on the basis of political patronage, with some notable exceptions 
of bipartisan appointments to the Supreme Court made on the basis of intel-
lectual excellence. Beginning at least as far back as the Carter Admini-
stration, however, not only Presidents but congresspersons, political op-
eratives, and ideological groups began to realize that they needed the 
courts to ensure the long range success of their key policies. According 
to one study, policy activists have emerged as the main source of grass-
roots support for the parties and their candidates, and they have been vo-
cal in their demands that judicial as well as legislative candidates meet 
their criteria.157 Thus, the judges, too, like the legislators, have become 
more polarized as have their conªrmation processes. Valid or not, there is 
no doubt that judicial selection is now a prominent and legitimate cam-
paign issue in Presidential and Senatorial elections. 
Some view Harriet Miers’s case as indicative of another change in 
judicial politics—that the nominee need not only be within the accept-
able ideological range of the party core but that she must display all the 
attributes of an intellectually respected professional with a thick résumé 
of accomplishment. Then-Senate Judiciary Committee ranking member Pat-
rick Leahy recently said of a court of appeals nominee that she was what 
was called for, a “qualiªed consensus nominee,” but added: “The Senate 
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must not rubberstamp judicial nominees who will fail to act as a constitu-
tional check on the Administration’s unprecedented power grab.”158 
Much study has been devoted to tracking what happens after nomi-
nees are conªrmed, become judges, and confront cases involving issues near 
and dear to the hearts of their sponsors. Most of the evidence seems to sup-
port the notion that they vote predictably along the lines of their sponsors 
where they have discretion and are not bound by precedent.159 There are 
also occasional surprises. However predictable judges may be, it still re-
mains essential for the Senate to get better at probing nominees’ attitudes 
and thoughts on presidential power and checks and balances. 
Judicial review is most indispensable to separation of powers in 
times of strongly uniªed government, when Congress and the President 
are in sync and internal checks in both braches at their most dormant.160 
That, however, is also likely to be a time when the President and Congress 
have the most to say about the appointment of judges. Congress should 
always keep in mind that the same judges will sit in times of divided gov-
ernment, when Congress’s own powers may be at stake. Thus, it should 
respect the constitutional necessity for a truly independent judiciary. 
V. Conclusion 
In the Constitution that emerged at Philadelphia in 1787, the Fram-
ers made the structure of government power the document’s central fea-
ture. Rather than rely on what James Madison derisively called “parchment 
barriers,”161 the Constitution established a system of checks and balances 
to safeguard liberty. As the practice of politics has evolved, the capacity 
of that system to protect liberty has come under serious challenge. 
In this Article, we have not sought to catalog those threats exhaustively, 
but rather to identify those with the most salience in contemporary debates. 
We have also offered a variety of proposals—most of them already the 
subject of public discourse—to make the system of checks and balances 
work more effectively. These proposals have no partisan coloring. Rather, 
they are meant to address the systemic workings of the government on a 
practical level. Our suggestions are intended to improve in various ways 
the government’s openness and accountability, its capacity for delibera-
tion, and its compliance with internal mechanisms designed to prevent 
abuse and illegal conduct. There is no particular reason to expect that any 
of these reforms would favor one party or the other over time. 
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From the standpoint of getting reforms adopted, we ªnd reason for 
optimism in the most recent congressional elections. Voters across the 
country showed their discontent with the way politics is practiced in gov-
ernment generally, and in Congress particularly. According to national 
exit polls, “when asked which issue was extremely important to their vote, 
more voters said corruption and ethics in government than any other is-
sue, including the war.”162 In addition, the new majority in Congress cam-
paigned on a pledge to pursue reform in the way the government operates.163 
Senator Schumer, of course, was an important architect of that campaign. 
We commend him for his pledge and will be watching to see if his col-
leagues follow through on their commitment. Just as the danger of presi-
dential overreaching does not automatically disappear with a change of 
administration, so too must each Congress look inward at its own processes 
and practices to ensure that it presents a strong, vibrant and ethical pres-
ence to fulªll its unique functions in the checks-and-balances construct.164 
We are hopeful that this new Congress will do just that. 
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